I was prompted to write this by a post by Lawrence O'Donnell in the Huffington Post. Normally, O'Donnell is one of the most astute political observers, so when O'Donnell gets something wrong (that he is agreeing for once with Rush Limbaugh should serve as a hint) suggests that his misunderstanding is widely shared. O'Donnell writes:

Rush Limbaugh is vexed by the Iraq Study Group. At first, Rush said the group's report was not a cut and run prescription. He now says, "This is cut and run, surrender without the words." And, now, Rush is right.

The Iraq Study Group's report is a very respectable cover document for American surrender in Iraq.

America never formally surrenders, so we have to call surrender something else. In Vietnam, we called it Vietnamization... The Iraq Study Group delivered a plan for the Iraqization of the combat--complete the "training" of the Iraqi "army" and "police," then embed some American officers with Iraqi units and wish them luck as the bulk of the American forces sneak out the back door without anyone ever using the word surrender. This is exactly what most of the American people are looking for--a way out of Iraq without calling it surrender.

I think that the fundamental mistake that O'Donnell is making here is seeing Iraq as analogous to Vietnam. Yes, the occupation of Iraq has turned into a quagmire the way Vietnam was. But Iraq is different from Vietnam in that withdrawal from Iraq would constitute a much greater strategic setback for the US than Vietnam ever was. The US foreign policy elite realizes this, and that is why it is no more willing to get out of Iraq than Bush is. Like most mainstream commentators, O'Donnell does not appear to realize how differently this elite views the war in Iraq from how most Americans do.

The Stony Brook University sociologist Michael Schwartz provides a very cogent analysis of the implications of the report. (Schwartz has been a very perceptive commentator on the situation in Iraq ever since the initial invasion.)

The ISG report is not an "exit strategy;" it is a new plan for achieving the Bush administration's imperial goals in the Middle East.

The ISG report stands out among the present flurry of re-evaluations as the sole evaluation of the war by a group not beholden to the President; as the only report containing an unadorned negative evaluation of the current situation (vividly captured in the oft-quoted phrase "dire and deteriorating"); and as the only public document with unremitting criticism of the Bush administration's conduct of the war.

It is this very negativity that brings into focus the severely constrained nature of the debate now underway in Washington -- most importantly, the fact that U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (immediate or otherwise) is simply not going to be part of the discussion. Besides explicitly stating that withdrawal is a terrible idea -- "our leaving would make [the situation] worse" -- the Baker report is built around the idea that the United States will remain in Iraq for a very long time.

To put it bluntly, the ISG is not calling on the Bush administration to abandon its goal of creating a client regime that was supposed to be the key to establishing the U.S. as the dominant power in the Middle East. Quite the contrary. As its report states: "We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq." If you ignore the text sprinkled with sugar-coated words like "representative government," the report essentially demands that the Iraqi government pursue policies shaped to serve "America's interest and values in the years ahead."

Don't be fooled by this often quoted passage from the Report: "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq." The ebullient interpretations of this statement by the media have been misleading in three different ways. First, the combat brigades mentioned in this passage represent far less than half of all the troops in Iraq. The military police, the air force, the troops that move the equipment, those assigned to the Green Zone, the soldiers that order, store, and move supplies, medical personnel, intelligence personnel, and so on, are not combat personnel; and they add up to considerably more than 70,000 of the approximately 140,000 troops in Iraq at the moment. They will all have to stay -- as well as actual combat forces to protect them and to protect the new American advisors who are going to flood into the Iraqi army -- because the Iraqi army has none of these units and isn't going to develop them for several years, if ever.

Second, the ISG wants those "withdrawn" American troops "redeployed," either inside or outside Iraq. In all likelihood, this will mean that at least some of them will be stationed in the five permanent bases inside Iraq that the Bush administration has already spent billions constructing, and which are small American towns, replete with fast food restaurants, bus lines, and recreation facilities. There is no other place to put these redeployed troops in the region, except bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, none of which are really suited to, or perhaps eager to, host a large influx of American troops (guaranteed to be locally unpopular and a magnet for terrorist attacks).

Third, it's important not to ignore those two modest passages: "subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground" and "not necessary for force protection." In other words, if the Iraqi troops meant to replace the redeployed American ones are failures, then some or all of the troops might never be redeployed. In addition, even if Iraqi troops did perform well, Americans might still be deemed necessary to protect the remaining (non-combat) troops from attack by insurgents and other forces. Given that American troops have not been able to subdue the Sunni rebellion, which is still on a growth curve, it is highly unlikely that their Iraqi substitutes will do any better. In other words, even if the "withdrawal" parts of the Baker report were accepted by the President, which looks increasingly unlikely, its plan has more holes and qualifications than Swiss cheese. (Why Withdrawal Is Unmentionable)

The upshot is that things are going to have to get even worse in Iraq before the establishment catches up with the American people and realizes the Iraq war is unwinnable. Overall, things have not changed all that much in Washington, DC since the time of the lead-up to the war and the initial invasion. The foreign policy establishment—and not just the Bush administration an the neocons—is still unable to comprehend the actual state of affairs in Iraq.

To keep up with that, TomDispatch is an excellent resource. (Juan Cole is of course also good, but he specializes more in day-to-day reports than in the kinds of overviews that get posted at TomDispatch. But Cole does direct his readers to those reviews.)

heathlander posted a diary that makes similar points to the ones here last week after the ISG report came out, citing Tom Engelhardt, the editor of TomDispatch. But I thought I would recommend TomDispatch more directly, since it is an invaluable antidote to the tunnel vision of the mainstream press.